Revisit Euphemisms from the Perspective of Intentionality by Huang, Lijun
Forum for Linguistic Studies Volume 1 Issue 1 | 2019 | 83
Revisit Euphemisms from the Perspective of Intentionality
Huang Lijun*
College of Foreign Languages & Cultures, Sichuan University; Email: huanglj@scu.edu.cn
Abstract: This paper studies the role of intentionality in the process of generating euphemisms. Intentionality, as the key
to human consciousness activities, is not only the starting point of the language user’s consciousness activity related to
euphemism generation, but also functions through the whole generating process. Its functions can be specified as
triggering, orientation, and selection. Collective intentionality restricts individual intentionality and has the function of
identifying and integrating individual intentionality. Under the effect of collective intentionality and social environment,
the euphemisms are renewed with the time and bear features unique to a particular group.
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1.Introduction
Euphemisms are a common linguistic phenomenon which pervades in every part of people’s life. As the
“lubricant” for verbal communication, euphemisms provide enormous cases for scholars to study what has been (and is)
going on in our language, our minds and our culture. The existing research on euphemisms have been done from the
perspectives of rhetoric, general linguistics, pragmatics, sociology, cross-cultural comparison, etc., and the findings well
explain the formal features of euphemisms and the rules and external factors of its use.
Cognitive linguistics provides a new approach to the study of euphemisms by analyzing and interpreting the
cognitive mechanism of euphemisms. The relevant studies mainly apply Lakoff & Johnson's Mapping Theory and
Focaunnier's Blending Theory to explain that the cognitive basis of euphemisms is the similarity/contiguity
association between the source and target domains in people's conceptual systems. Then they further propose the
metaphorical mechanism, metonymy mechanism and metaphor/metonymy mechanism of euphemisms (Chen Liwen
2006; Shao Junhang, Fan WeiWei 2004; Lu Weizhong, Kong Shujuan 2006). However, the cognitive-mind mechanism
of euphemism generation calls for more research efforts, that is to say, what kind of mental activity being processed in
the brain of the language user needs to be studied in detail.
This paper attempts to study euphemisms from the perspective of philosophy of mind. The focus lies on the role of
intentionality in the process of euphemism generation, including individual intentionality and collective intentionality.
The philosophy of mind has carried out in-depth research on intentionality, revealing its intentional and intellectual
attributes from many aspects, and thus providing a good foundation for examining the role and characteristics of
intentionality in language use.
2. General description of intentionality
The concept of “intentionality” comes from scholastic philosophy. In the nineteenth century, German philosopher
and psychologist Franz Brentano introduced it to contemporary philosophy and defined it as one of the characteristics of
"mental phenomenon", thus distinguishing it from "physical phenomenon". For Brentano, every mental phenomenon
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involves the “intentional inexistence” of an object toward which the mental phenomenon is directed (Brentano, 1973).
After Brentano, Husserl further developed the theory of intentionality, arguing that intentionality is the directionality of
consciousness to an object. He analyzed intentionality in terms of three central ideas: intentional act, intentional object
and intentional content. The intentional act cannot be distinguished from its object, which is the topic, thing or state of
affairs that the act is about. The intentional content of an intentional event is the way in which the subject thinks about
or presents to her/himself the intentional object. (Husserl, translated by Ni, 1998:436)
The American philosopher John Searle also systematically studied and explained intentionality. In his view,
intentionality is the generality of the mind that can be directed, about, or related in various forms, to objects and events
in the world. (John Searle, translated by Li, 2007:83) The human mind is thus based on the intentional aboutness, linked
to the world through human cognition and practical activities. “It connects us to the real world through intentionality”
(ibid.98). It is easy to see that directionality is the most important feature of intentionality. The human mind uses the
aboutness of intentionality as the starting point for construe, and people’s cognition and practical activities are thus
connected to the outside world in a targeting manner. In another word, the human mind can be about an object and on
the object express some kind of intention, or beliefs, hopes, wishes, likes, hates, praises, etc., so as to better carry out
the activities targeting at the object, getting the personal act and the society linked.
Intentionality generally has three characteristics: aboutness, directionality, and parasitism. Regarding the use of
language, the starting point of meaning initiates with the intentionality of the mind. That is to say, the language user can
only develop the object-directed activities on language through the intentional function of the mind. Directionality
means the selectivity of intentionality in linguistic representation. When the language user is trying to construe
meanings, he/she always chooses something that is meaningful to him/herself, making it the focus of attention and also
salience, and representing the salient point in certain linguistic forms or expressions. E.g. a) My father spends most of
the morning on the bus. b) Dad wasted most of the morning on the bus. The two sentences describe the same event, but
the behavioral states expressed are different and the speaker’s attitudes toward the event are apparently different. The
differences result from the directionality of the speaker’s intentionality. Parasitism means to "parasitize" the
intentionality of the language user to linguistic symbols, that is, to parasitize the language user's own psychological
state or feelings into the language. When the representation of various mental states embodying intentionality is realized
in the form of language, the linguistic representation of intentionality is fulfilled.
Searle also introduces collective intentionality to explore the role of intentionality in human social groups. He
distinguishes between "We-intentionality" and "I-intentionality". There are intentional forms such as "I intend", "I hope",
"I believe", etc. and also intentional forms such as "we intend", "we hope", "we believe", etc. The latter is the
embodiment of collective intentionality. Individual intentionality derives from collective intentionality. Collective
intentionality is the foundation of all social activities, which builds up the basis for people in a group to cooperate and
to share ideas and emotions. (John Searle, translated by Li, 2007:117) For example, a basketball game, a rally, a
performance, a class in a school, etc. can all reflect the role of collective intentionality. It is via collective intentionality
that human consciousness, mind, language and society are inter-related and inter-connected. The process of language
use exemplifies the cooperative process based on collective intentionality. The acquisition of language and language
communication are, to some extent, the result of collective interaction.
3. Intentionality and euphemisms
“Substitution” is the core feature of euphemistic expressions. The so-called "substitution" means that in a certain
context blunt expressions which are usually coarse, painful or offensive words can be replaced by euphemistic
expressions which are naturally mild, agreeable or roundabout words. If we set the blunt expression, i.e. words that for
some reason cannot be said or written directly, is “A” and the euphemism is “B”, then in a certain context, “ A” and “B”
are identical and can be replaced by each other. The substitution can be formularized as "A is B".
The semantics of euphemisms have two levels of meanings--exterior and interior. The exterior meaning is
auspicious, implicit, polite, inclusive and beautified meanings, and the interior meaning is the euphemized objects
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which are normally unpleasant things or events. In addition to seeing euphemisms as the semantic substitution, we will
further explore how the two levels of semantics are combined and united and why euphemisms can be used to refer to
the things/events that are not actual referents of the euphemistic expressions.
To answer the above questions, we should not only analyze euphemisms from the aspects of linguistic features,
semantic substitution and pragmatic functions, but also further study why language users can use euphemisms to refer
to external things that are different from their direct referential objects. Here, for the convenience of detailed
examination, we tentatively give a new definition of euphemism from a cognitive-mind perspective as follows:
An expression of “B”, in place of another expression of “A” to refer to the thing/event of “A’”, is a euphemism, if
and only if:
1) A' is something that cannot be expressed straightforwardly for some reason;
2) B cannot refer to A’ in the context of the actual situation;
3) But can refer to A' under the specific intentionality of the language user;
4) B and A have similarity/contiguity relationships.
First, the semantic feature of euphemisms is the substitution of two expressions (A and B). The reason for the
substitution is that in a particular context, the language user needs to mention things that for some reason cannot be said
or written directly. “The actual situation” refers to the real life situation which people are accustomed to and tend to take
as normal. In the actual situation, the direct referent of “B” is not “A'”, but under the specific intentionality, “B” can be
used to refer to the external thing “A'”. “B” can be used to refer to “A'” because of the similarity/contiguity
relationship between “B” and “A”.
Intentionality includes two dimensions: intentional content and intentional attitude. Intentional content refers to the
content of the language user's consciousness activities and how such content is embodied in a certain linguistic
expression. Intentional content is the content of the language user's intentional activities, indicating the focus of his/her
attention, and thus the core content of a linguistic expression. As the intentional content is the attention focus of the
language user, it is the point that intentionality is positioning at. When it is embodied in linguistic forms, it is the
autonomous component, i.e. the kernel of expression. The external objects that euphemistic expressions try to position
at are often things or events that are not pleasant to say in a straightforward manner, such as: the old and sick, defects,
errors, body organs, physiological functions, crime, war, the appellation of vulnerable groups, etc. When the language
user focuses his/her attention on these things or events, the process of generating euphemisms thus starts up.
Since the same intentional content can be delivered with different attitudes, this leads to multiple ways of
generating expressions and discourse. Here is another dimension involved in intentionality: intentional attitude. The
intentional attitude means what kind of attitude the language user holds toward the intentional content. Any intentional
content, once entering the intentionality of the language user, will be under the observation and operation of the
intentional attitude. In terms of language use, intentional attitude is the basis of intentionality positioning, which can be
divided into three sub-categories:
1) psychological state, such as beliefs, knowing, doubts, fears, hopes, love, hatred, etc.;
2) psychological measurement of the effect on the object, for example, the object is considered to be primary to
[as opposed to "secondary"], prior to, and prominent to [as opposed to "latent"], before ... some other things;
3) certain psychological orientation of observing things, such as being normal (neutral), vivid, euphemistic,
humorous, exaggerated, affectionate/cold, reproachful/complimentary, positive/ negative, beautifying /
uglifying, etc. (Xu Shenghuan 2013)
As for the generation of euphemistic expressions, the intentional attitude is the basis of the language user's
intention orientation in the whole process: under the observation of psychological modes such as fear, doubt, hope,
intention, etc.; under the observation of psychological measurement of behind and latent; under the observation of
psychological orientations such as being roundabout, humorous, complimentary, beautifying, kind, etc., the language
user chooses gentle, pleasant, inclusive, euphemistic words to replace harsh, offensive, discriminatory, and crude words.
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In the form of [A is B], the language user chooses B to replace A under the observation of certain psychological state,
measurement and orientation.
Intentionality, as the key to human consciousness activities, is not only the starting point of the consciousness
activity related to euphemism generation, but also functions through the whole generating process. Its functions can be
specified as follows: triggering, orientation, and selection. The triggering effect is reflected when the language user
focuses his/her attention on an external object, namely, the first positioning in the process of generating euphemisms.
When the language user focuses their attention on a thing or event that cannot be said or written directly, the process of
euphemism generation begins. It triggers a series of consciousness activities in the mind of the language user, and
completes the process of generating euphemisms under certain conditions. After positioning, the language user focuses
on the selected information to achieve the orientation of the usage event. For example, in English the euphemistic
expressions for "old people" include "sunset years", "white tops", "wrinkles", "seasoned citizen", "nursing home
residents", and so on. These expressions have different literal meanings of their own, but they are all euphemisms that
can be used to mean the “old people”. This is because under the orientation of intentionality, language user focuses on
different information, that is, the different characteristics of “old people”: the last lap of the process of life, whitening
hair, wrinkles on the face, colorful and rich life experience, likely to live in nursing homes, etc. The language user
focuses on the different characteristics of the "old people", realizing the orientation of the usage events, and ultimately
generating different euphemisms that replace "old people". However, people cannot arbitrarily choose an expression to
replace the blunt expression to achieve euphemistic effect. "Newly-made euphemisms must be related to their original
language symbols to a certain extent, and can provide the clues for people to understand what they refer to." (Shu
Dingfang 1989). The establishment of the connection between euphemisms and blunt words is the result of the
intentional choice. The establishment of the connection between "old people" and "sunset" in the above example is that
the subject's intentionality is located in the structural characteristics of "sunset" and thus establishes the
connection between "old people" and "sunset" based on the similarity. The connection between the two is based on the
similarity of the “process stage”, the “old people” is the last stage of life, and “sunset” is the last stage of the day.
4. Collective intentionality and euphemism
Collective intentionality was originally proposed by R. Tuomela and K. Miller in the journal article of "We-
intentions" published in the issue of Philosophical Studies in 1988. They analyze the collective intentionality with
respect to individual intentionality and mutual beliefs, and believe that collective intentionality is reflected in the
collective actions of members of society, on the premise that members of society have common beliefs. (R. Tuomela &
K. Miller, 1988:53) Margaret Gilbert believes that collective intentionality is the intention of each group member, and
that this intention is open to the collective, and they follow the common commitment to carry out effective actions to
achieve the intention (Liu Haitao, 2008:84) John Searle believes that collective intentionality is a primary intentionality,
existing in the individual’s brain the same way as the individual intentionality. (John Searle, translated by Li, 2007:116)
That is to say, collective intentionality and individual intentionality coexist in the individual's brain, and the individual
has both "I-intentionality" and "we-intentionality". Michael Bratman further proposed that the generation of collective
intentionality is a kind of connection between individual intentions, not just the interaction between individuals and the
external environment (Liu Haitao, 2008:86) The philosophers have made different yet co-related discussions on
collective intentionality from different angles. From their discussion, it can be seen that collective intentionality is
the basis for social activities and exchanges. Collective intentionality not only helps group members collaborate with
each other but also helps intentional states shared among group members such as beliefs, wishes, intentions and the like.
According to Searle, objective social reality is literally created by means of We-intentionality. The general form of
such intentionality is “X counts as Y in context C”, or “X becomes Y in context C”. (John Searle, translated by Li, 2007:
120) This form can be interpreted as: X counts as Y, and the prerequisite is that the collective member C forms an
agreement, acknowledging that X is Y under certain conditions. By adopting a We-intentionality that X counts as
or becomes Y in C, individuals take it as a fact that X counts as or becomes Y in C. A familiar example is the institution
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of money, which is created by the We-intentionality to treat certain pieces of paper or metal, issued by the appropriate
governmental authority, as money. The making of a promise (X) counts as getting married (Y) in the context of a
marriage ceremony (C). The making of a promise can function as getting married on the premise that members of a
particular community have an agreement on that and all tend to accept it accordingly.
It is through collective intentionality that people connect the mind, consciousness, language, and society.
Searle believes that collective intentionality is the foundation of all social activities. Collective intentionality gives a
particular group of people a shared mind and emotion and forms the basis for mutual cooperation and communication.
Important ideas and viewpoints that are widely prevalent in a group are stored in people's knowledge structure and
long-term memory, and become a kind of conventional consciousness. They will be activated and used for making
reference, description, comprehension and representation in certain situations. (Xu Shenghuan, 2006: 35)
Collective intentionality is the foundation of all social communication. Individual intentionality exists in the brain
of the individual and has a private nature. Under the collective intentionality, people form a unified intentionality within
a specific group, and thus cooperate and communicate on that basis. Individual intentionality is the basis of collective
intentionality while collective intentionality is a set of intentions that are formed on the basis of all members of a group.
At the same time, individual intentionality is subject to collective intentionality. "As for individual intentionality,
collective intentionality plays a role in restricting and is useful for the identification and integration of individual
intentionality. (Xu Shengzhen, 2006:36) In terms of the generation of euphemistic expressions, the role of identification
and integration of collective intentionality are reflected in the following aspects:
Euphemisms are in a constant state of flux as the tabooed objects change with the times. The euphemisms originate
from social taboos. Social taboos change with the times, from the initial death taboo to the later euphemisms of illness,
defects, errors, body organs, some physiological functions, indecent or inappropriate behavior. In modern times,
inclusive language emerges which are used to take the place of discriminatory language. This process of change reflects
the identification and integration of collective intentionality. Let us revisit Searle's general form of collective
intentionality "X counts as Y in C", where X is the original phenomenon, X is Y under people's collective intentionality,
that is, people's mutual agreement, consent and acceptance. Searle’s general form of collective intentionality can well
explain how and why a certain things or events are seen as tabooed and need to be euphemized. X is a variety of things,
events or phenomena. Under the identification and integration of collective intentionality, that is, the agreement, consent
and acceptance among group members, a certain event or thing is determined to be the euphemized object Y. For
example, in the old days, "opera performance" was an industry that was despised by people in China, and its status was
low in society. Under the effect of identification and integration of collective intentionality, the "opera performance"
was identified as a euphemized object. That is to say, the “opera performance” is taken as a euphemized object by
means of We-intentionality, its being recognized as a low-ranking and despicable industry. When it is mentioned, it
needs to be replaced by euphemistic words. Therefore, there are a great number of euphemisms for actors, such as "伶
伦" (ling lun), "伶人" (ling ren), "秋娘" (qiu niang), "小怜" (xiao ling), "妙音" (miao yin) and so on. In modern society,
the social status of actors has been greatly improved, and acting has become the career most of the young people
eagerly pursue. Consequently, under the effect of collective intentionality, members of society no longer recognize
acting as the euphemized object, and those euphemisms relating to actors and acting that have been widely used are
almost dying in daily Chinese. It can be seen that the change of euphemized objects is the result of synergistic
effect between the collective intentionality and social environment.
2) Different social groups produce different euphemisms for the same tabooed object. Taking death as an example,
in Chinese, “去见马克思”（going to see Marx）is the euphemistic expression for death. However, in English, “going to
see Marx” does mean death or to die. English euphemisms for death such as “be asleep in the Arms of God", "to be with
their Father", "join the angels", "have fallen asleep in the Lord", "pay Saint Peter a visit" do not have equivalent
expressions in Chinese. That is to say, in the conventional consciousness of the Chinese, the concept of "Marx" and
"death" are stored as stereotypical relations in people's brains. Under the effect of the collective intentionality, "the
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stereotypical relations are retrieved as the structural premise and logical presupposition of language use". (Xu
Shengzhen, 2006:36) This plausibly explains why in Chinese "going to see Marx" can be used to mean death. However,
in the conventional consciousness of people in English-speaking countries, there is no stereotypical relations between
“Marx” and “death” that can be used as a structural premise of language use. In their conventional consciousness,
concepts of “God”, “Father”, "angels", "Lord", "Saint Peter" and "death" are stored as stereotypical relations in
their brains and the above euphemisms are generated under the effect of collective intentionality to indicate death.
3) Some euphemized objects cannot be found in certain languages. The categories of euphemisms in English and
Chinese have a lot of commonalities, including death and funeral, diseases and disabilities, body organs, secretion and
excretion, crime and punishment, war and disaster, occupation, shortcomings and mistakes. However, euphemized
objects in English and Chinese also have their own characteristics. There are a large number of euphemisms of titles and
appellations in Chinese, with a total of 177 entries in Dictionary of Chinese Euphemisms compiled by Zhang Gonggui.
They are classified into three categories: "interpersonal relationship and appellation", "couple’s titles and relationship",
"titles for other members and relationship". In Chinese, father is respectfully called as “令尊” (ling zun) and “家尊” (jia
zun), and father-in-law is respectfully called as “泰山”(tai shan) and “冰翁” (bing weng). Such euphemisms are rare in
English. In the old days, China was a highly hierarchical society, advocating the norms of feudal ethical code. Under the
effect of identification and integration of collective intentionality, the "interpersonal title" was identified as a
euphemized object which required people to use polite and respectful expressions to refer to. In addition, English has a
lot of euphemisms about old age, and RW Holder has compiled a total of 58 old age euphemisms in A Dictionary of
Euphemism, such as "blue hair", "evening of your days", "golden years", "mature", "middle-aged". "Senior citizens".
However, there are very few euphemisms about the old age in Chinese. Zhang Gonggui's Dictionary of Chinese
Euphemism contains zero entry for old age. The reason is the different orientations that the different groups make
toward the old age/old age under the effect of the collective intentionality. In English-speaking cultures old age is
identified as a stage of loneliness in life, and it sometimes arouses negative association in people’s mind. It is regarded
as a euphemized object, which leads to many euphemistic words related to old age. Old age, however, is regarded
differently in Chinese culture. In the conventional consciousness of the Han nationality, old age is a stage of rich
experience and old people are normally respected in society. Therefore, it is usually not considered as a euphemized
object, and the conventional consciousness of respecting the elderly is the result of collective intentionality.
In sum, collective intentionality restricts individual intentionality and has the function of identifying and
integrating individual intentionality. Under the effect of collective intentionality, euphemisms are renewed as the time
progresses and bear some uniqueness of a certain group.
5. Intentionality Interpretation Framework of Euphemisms
Based on the above discussion, we summarize the intentionality interpretation framework of euphemisms as
follows:
Figure 1. Intentionality Interpretation Framework
Forum for Linguistic Studies Volume 1 Issue 1 | 2019 | 89
1) The intentionality interpretation includes two aspects, namely collective intentionality and individual
intentionality.
2) Under the effect of collective intentionality, a certain group forms common cognition, intention and emotion.
Under the synergic effect of collective intentionality and social environment, the euphemisms are renewed with the time
and bear features unique to a certain group.
3) Collective intentionality restricts individual intentionality and has the function of identifying and integrating
individual intentionality. Individual intentionality assumes the task of “meaning incarnation”. Only with the intentional
participation of individuals can the meaning be obtained in the form of intentional activities and be embodied.
4) Individual intentionality has two dimensions, namely the language user's intentional content and intentional
attitude.
5) Intentional content is the content of the language user's intentional activities, indicating the focus of his/her
attention. In the process of euphemism generation, the intentional content is the thing or event the language user focuses
his/her attention on, that is, the thing or event the euphemism represents.
6) Intentional attitude is the attitude the language user holds toward the intentional content. It is the basis of the
language user's intentional orientation. Intentional attitude can be divided into three sub-categories: psychological state,
psychological measurement, and psychological orientation. In the process of euphemism generation, under the
observation of psychological states such as fear, doubt, hope, intention, etc.; under the observation of psychological
measurement of behind and latent; under the observation of psychological orientations such as being roundabout,
humorous, complimentary, beautifying, kind etc., the language user chooses gentle, pleasant, inclusive, euphemistic
words to replace harsh, offensive, discriminatory, and crude ones.
7) Intentional content and intentional attitude work jointly in the process of euphemism generation. There is an
autonomy-dependence relationship between intentional content and intentional attitude. On the one hand, with different
intentional attitudes, the same intentional content can be processed into different euphemisms. That is to say, in the
formula of "A is B", “B” is not a single one ; instead it is a collection of B1, B2, B3, B4… On the other hand, the same
intentional attitude can be dependent on different intentional contents, thus generating different euphemisms. For
example, under the effect of the psych-orientation of beautifying, barber is euphemized as “hair dresser”, tailor as
“fashion designer”, butcher as “meat technologist”, housewife as “domestic engineer”.
6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of intentionality in the process of generating euphemisms, and expounds and explains
the relationship between individual intentionality and collective intentionality and the role of both in euphemism
generation. The intentionality interpretation framework provides a unified explanation of the generation mechanism and
epochal characteristics of euphemisms. This is a tentatively new way to study euphemisms, in the hope of enriching and
deepening the research on euphemisms.
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